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PREFACE 
In this short study I have attempted to place bureaucracies and 
bureaucratic operations in their proper context in our systan o£ goveHnnent. 
My emphasis is upon the political nature of both bureeuoraeies and their 
operations. The• are not natters whiQh 81"e well understood by the vast 
majority ot our citizens. By nature the topic is 10mewhat broader than 
I woul.d have preferred it to be, bat use.tul knowledge has both breadth and 
depth dimanaiona, and the student as ....U as the practitioner � public 
administrat.ion baa need far both. 
Debts are owed to the author• listed in the selected bibliograpey, 
as well a8 to maiv others not listed for sharpening my perceptions of marzy" 
aspects of W?"eau.oreciea• which I first l.earned by experience, during thirty' 
years of sarvieo in the u.s. Marine Corps, both aa a "bureaucrat• and as a 
subject o! bureaucratic operationa-military a1'¥1 civilian alike. 
I wish to express nur since.rest thanks to each member of the Political 
Science Department ot Eastern Illinois University for the unsparing time 
and effort that be has given to th1e student on each occasion that advice 
or help \award a better umerstanding of subject matter was needed. or 
oour• th91 are all oonpl.etely exonerated fJ'm cry ahortcanings 1n this 
stuey, which are all mine alone. It I have not learned, it is not because 
the subject matter vu not.well taught in the f'irst pl.ace. 
To Doctor Joeeph T. ConnelJ.7, my adviser far graduate study• I owe a 
special debt of gratitude rcr his J>8tiance, understanding and tactful 
suggestion& during Tf'iY entire course of stu<\v. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study is to examine the charges that 
go"'91"!Dent bul-eaucracy 1s a serious threat to our constitutional sy-stan 
ot government, particularly to our syst.:i of checks S1d balances, the 
provisions tor the separation 0£ powers and the theories ot representative 
and responsible goTernman't. These are by no means all of the charges 
'Which have been made against bureaucracy and bureaucrats J but 1 certainly, 
they include the more serious ones. Most CC\1111110nly, the charges are 
expressed as 11the bureaucrats are taking over the gowrnnent,11 or "the 
President• himselt, is all rightJ but it is that crowd around him that 
bothers me." In each case :reference was C.ing made to persons who 
apparently have a lot to do and say about the way our government is run, 
even though they are not elected to a position 1n it. Host of us have 
heard the above complaints since he has been old enough to remember. It 
is suggested that they ar e  as o1d as our govet'ment itsel.t. 
The prineipal reason !or undertaking this stud'$' is to attanpt some 
synthesis ot the course work• independent study and practical experience, 
which this writel9 has had v.1.th bureaucraaiea, to test his Wlde.rstanding of 
what he should have 1eamed from those sources. Secondly, it is hoped 
that this study will provide a satisfactory overview of both the 
adllinistrative process and bureaucratic operations to allay the fears 
of some of our citizens who might really believe that the bureaucrats 
1 
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are taking over our government. Lastly, of the some seven commonly accepted 
aspects or public administration, that one concerning the po11t1cs of 
administration is the one with which political scientists shou1d be most 
concerned. One can become a good administrator without having studied 
political science, but not without learning that public administration is 
about equal parts of politics and administration. An early unlerstanding 
o£ this b•aic .taet will he� students and practitioners all.ke. 
The scope or t.his study is limited, primarily, to policy making 
am pol.1ey implementation at the leNel of Congressional committee• 
admillistl°ati'ftl agency, federal court of appeals and interest group level. 
'While broad general policy is still made, endorsed or unmade at the 
highest level of tJ1e President, the Congress and the Supreme Court, the 
operating policies with which the public is most concerned are made or 
not made at the lower level. Concentration will be on the delegation of 
powers to agencies for rule-cnaldng, rule-application and adjudication, 
t.ogether 'With the Political consequences vhich follow. Attention will be 
focused on the poll tical aspects of bureaucratic operations, vhich tend 
to keep th• in consonance Wi. th our normative concepts ot constitutional. 
government. All discussion of bureaucracies and bureaucratic operations 
in this stldy is limited to the bureaucracy of the executive branch of 
our government. 
For the purpose of this study it w1ll be su:f'ficient to define 
the bureaucracy of the executiv"Et branch as the totality of groups of 
non-electiw government otticials characterised by specialization � 
functions, adherence to 1'1x8d rules and a hierarchy of authority, engaged 
in the administration ot public policy arv:l/or law within limits and in 
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acco�ance with standards set by Congress. The bureauc:r"7 of the ex.ecuti:ve 
branch is not a monolithic organisation. It is composed of many and 
diverse unite each with a particular tuncitie>n to per.tO!ill. The on.ly 
teature that they all have in common is that they are all organised 
bureaucratically. The bureaucracies are composed of political appointees 
and career pereonnal who man the F.ixecutive office ot the President, the 
twelve e:mcut1 ft departmenta, the nine !ndepsident regulatory commissions, 
the 8099 thiriq independent agencies and the seVeral gov8l"unent corporations. 
Not all employees in a burencracy are "bur•ucr!l'ts." The tem "bureaucrat• 
as used in this study re.fers to all political appointees (whether tor set 
tems or not) al¥i to the .men in the top grades of the career service who 
have a considerable degree of discretion concerning what is to be done 
and how it ia to be done in oon.nsetion with the functions of tbeil' 
organisurbions. 
The approach and methodology are this wrl.ter•s own blends. The 
systems appl"'Oach with its inputs, outputs, feedbacks and continuous cycling 
See"lllS most appropriate fo:r this study• and it is used fo� the pr:i.noipal 
orientation. However• tbe group theory approach. the distributiw approach 
and the functional epproaoh have aome appl.1cation. Govunaental sub-syst.s 
deal witi'l interest groupa tor th• most pan; and allCh groups are particularly 
interested in the d18trib'1\1on of benefits and coata inc:l.dent to the 
functions of rule-cnald ng, rule-application and adj '1Ciicat1on• tllhich together 
with policy initiation .torm the ehiet function9 ot a goTe.rmellbal agency. 
The methodology is chiefly mpiri.eal deeoriptift/elfplaMtory with pri.ncipal 
reliance tlpO%l primary and aecondary souroea. For original &Gu.roee, � 
writer ia dependent upon his axperia:1Ce• •s an obser'lel"/participant of and 
in m1lital'1 bureauc�ee cnv a thi"1 year ap8rl ot militar,r eerv.tce. 
That axparlmee also 1ncluded dealing with gc,9Gr11nental bul'8aucracd.es at 
the national.., stne and local 1ema, as well •• vi.th _.. bureaUCl"ae1.es 
in .foreign countriea. 
Three bypot.he8" and a thffie hne been f'o:rmul.ated to guide t:tie 
st�. The tvt>ot-huee have been derived !':ma a cmbiMtion of study and 
axpe19DM. Since th• ere pr1llaril7 axpresaiona of ru.u.a, no particular 
e.f'torie will be ude to dispJll'OYe or wr1fy th•• It is .ugg� that. 
moat bur.aucnte would pnerdl.1' apiee With them. The h1Pothe- are 
•• fol..l..ovet 
l. Bureaucratic officiala ha- goals the eae as the 
rest of us. Those goals usually include professional competence, 
excellent perfOJ'mClCle• advancement,. power, pr•sttge, iafluezlC*, 
security and-loyalty to the nation and to pa?'ticular ideas• such 
ae dmoeraey, reasonable opport.wu.ty, rea.nable equality, and 
social j ust1ce. Hare than most of ws, they usually have a 
genuine de31re and responsibility to seJ'ft_, protect and promote 
the general interest to the eictent that they can identity it in 
the course or their 1t0rk. 
2. Bureaucrats seek to achieve their goals and those of 
t.hair organization 1n a rational man:MJ.'. They have to be utility 
muimizers 1n that � must act in the most efficient manner 
possLble, given their capabilities in the particular arees Within 
Which they must operate am the coats in Mme, effort. and JDONV' 
in aecu:ring reliable information upon whieh to .ct arnd to gen8Fate 
the required euppon tor thea pl.ans, progieane and operations • 
.3. The so-cal.led bureaucratic inertia is not so much a 
problem of a lack ot ideas and p-lans and the willingness to push 
them, as it is a problan ot mullteri.ng sufficient agreement and 
support .tran di verse and otten warr:ing sources to get these ideas 
and pl.ans adopted and impl.amented. Aa a consequence progress by 
bureal&Crati.c organiutiona ie most eommon1y made in Sllall inoreents, 
rather than by bold movu. Bureaucracies in a nav and important 
tield (NASA) or bureaucracies umler orlais conditions (national 
anergency or war) can operate in a bold, broad and aggressive manna?'1 
simply b ecause agreement and adequate su.pport are torthooming 
wxlel' such cirewstancea. 
The prl.Mipll t.hesis for this study is that ewointed political. 
executi-re• mid iq> pad.a car•r men who head the vario\ls bureaucracies of 
the executi.._ bNuch of our government do in .fact run our eoverrnent with 
respect to botb poli.07 formulation and policy impl.ementation. Th..i..s thesis 
is not t-o -..n 'Mlat the bureal.l�ata reign $UpretMlJ.1 nor that 'bbey are 
not aubjen to ebMlcs am balances by eleatod of ti� and the courte. 
It doe• ....-, that tecter&l agene.1.ea, w.hich are essentially bueaucratic 
org� du.1 pwi to deal t.horoughl.T and rationallJr with giwn 
pmblesq_. Jilva -..... an integral part of GU' go�. In euwort of 
this thes:laa the diacusaioa which foll.owe will outline the .tactore 'llhioh 
gave r1H '-· ttUI naed tor emcpanded acti v:i:t;y on the pUt or the tederal 
go� the \ools sel.Mted to deal with the many and varied pt"Obl•• 
iJm>l"fed.• the prooeasu for dealing with them cid ilhe ilrplioaticme ot 
the results tow our � of constitutional delocracy. 
I. BIG GOVERNMENT 
Last Days of taisses-Faire 
'l'he dominant political ideology 1n this country from the founding 
of the Republic down to the beginning of the Great Depression in 1929 
1 
was that of laissez-f'aire. The laissez-f'aire tradition was part of our 
heritage trom the Whig party of' Great Britain, which championed .tl'eedom 
from interf erenee by- govermrent into personal. attairs, particularly into 
social and economic matters. In short la1sen-.f'a1re meant treed.om f':rom 
government and not .treedom under gover11nent. Be.vord. the maintenance o� 
reasonable national security and domestic t.ranquill1t:r and the protection 
ot lite, liberty and property, nothing more in the way or interference 
was desired fl-om go'\'e?'nment. Unrestricted t.ree enterprise and rugged 
individualism were the cherished values included in the freedom to do as 
one pleased, so long as the reasonable rights of others were not violated 
or abused in too f".l.agrant a manner. Limited go"ternment was 'What the 
peo�e seened to want and that was what they received. or course it vas 
eorud.dared perfectly rlght and proper for limited govermnent to pro1'10te the 
values of the people by creating opportunities and providing subsidies. 
This was done. There was free or cheap land on the expanding frontier, 
resources were thrown open for exploitation and taritts were pxoovided to 
protect home industries. So long as these conditions could ba maintained, 
1see John K. Galbraith, American Capitalisn (Bost.one Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1952). First half of the book. · 
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the J.a�.U. l*l.ogy seemed to work quite well.. Howev•- the rapid 
1nduatriali11at:l.Oll and U"'banisat.ion of AHrica f olloving the Civil War 
brought aDotat • ohallg-1 situation. 
The llAW-1. C91Mtequences o! the operation of that ideology were 
well delomrWated in AJHrS,ca in the 1890•s. By that tiDle the frontier vaa 
closed• the reilZoad.a had been built, national. marketa bad been developed 
am the � co•ooi.4 and indalstrial enterprises had � largely 
monopolt1tld bJ' a tw .giants. '.l'he corporations bad laJ'gely replaced 
personal ....nbip lad opsration and � larger catbina'biona � 
corporatioM in the tol'll of triusta ware veil under ,,..,. • Great fortunes 
had been .. , reeom"Cea luKi been plundered, labor had been aploited and 
the stage had beeJ1 eet for the ttmuckrakers." Mak Twain caught the spirit 
of the 1870'1 vith hia, !!:! Gilded � (1873) and Lincoln Stettens caught 
the spirit at the tll1'ft oi' the centui-y vith hie, ,!h! Shane 2! thflt Cities. 
GoveJ:flll8nt had reacted rather weekly with the Interstate Commerce eo.ission. 
to regulate the plwxlering of the tamers by the rail.roads and with the 
Shennan Anti 'mat Aot to slow down the trends toward more am bigger 
monopolies in bua:lneea, industry aDi finance. No real successes could be 
claimed in either area. 
The ProgreSBive El-a 
The beginning of the end of laissez-faire political ideology in 
America Tllight well be dated from the beginnings of the Progressive 
movement in A-meriean polities. The Progressive movement (l9o&.1917) was 
considerably more conservative than the Populist movement which it 
8 
followed,, eTen though the Progress! ves pushed eonie of the Populists' 
better id.918.2 The Progres&i.ves sav dangers on both the right and left. 
On the 1'lght there waa the t.hreat of the lose of freedom and individualism 
to the � COJ.i><>rate power in the economy md its effect.a on social 
institutions. On the 1&.f't. was the threat of the loss of the seme va1uee 
from mob �e, or at b&st some type of aoatal.:1sm. The Progressives were 
more moderate. 'l'bey v.1.ehed to preseM'e the syst.an while ridding it of the 
veret a'buae• which had been made of it. Presiclent Theodore Rooaevel.t, with 
his Square Dql,1 attempted to reverse the trend toward increasing oorporate 
power by using sueh means .a he had at han:l in t.he way of 1awa end a 
popularised presideney to curb more monopolistic growth and to do some 
"trust busting" among those monopolies which had grown too large. 
Roosevelt did oot obj ect to Bise alone. What he did object to was the 
monopolistic character o! some corporations, which just naturally 
happened to be big. His main object! ve was to incorporate ecooornie and 
social values as well as political values in government.3 
Unf'ortunately, Roosevelt• s good beg1.nn1ng toward reform was not 
continued by President 'Wllllam H. Ta.ft, who fell back into the arms ot 
the rt()].d Guard'' Republicans. They could see nothing particularly wrong 
w:i th the way the govermen"t had been run by Republicans and the Democrats 
alike since the Civil War. The ri.tt in the Republican party between the 
Progressives and the "01d Guard" allowed Woodrow Wilson to capture the 
2Ricbard Ho!stadta, The American Political Tradition (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1948), P• 199-;-
3John Morton Blum, la! Regubli�aft &geevelt (Mev Yorkt Atheneum 
Press, 1968), P• xi. 
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presidency in 1912. Wilson• while a Democrat, was imbued with the 
progressive spirit. He took up where Roosevelt had left orr. His sty.La 
was different. Instead 0£ using the pres:ld81C7 as • "bully pulpit," as 
Roosevel.t had done, to produce needed refonn- he sought reform through 
legislati vo action by Congress. Such action resulted in the establ18hment 
of the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Trade Commission and t.he passage 
of the Clayton Anti Truat Act. Tvo amendments to the Constitution were 
passed by Congress and ratified by the states during Wilson' s tenure. His 
legislative skills created the image of the President as chiof legislator.4 
However• America's entrance into World War I in 1917 halted more P10ves by 
the government into the social an1 econonic fields and farther tJWl.f'J from 
laissez-faire ideology. 
Return to Nornalcy 
With the em of World War I and the election of President Warren G. 
IIa.'"Ciing (the first beneficiary of the last progressive reform-the women's 
vote ) the country settled i tsel.f back for what President Harding called a 
"return to nonnalcy. • Further reform or stricter enf'orcement of regulation 
of business and industrial interests seemed t.o be all but forgotten. 
Progressivisn seemed to have been forgotten also. In the election of 
1924, Robert :�. LaFollette received only about 4 million votes and Calvin 
Coolidee recei vod r�ore votes than the other tl«> carilidates put together. S 
�n c. Hargrove, Presidential Leaderehi,e (New York: The 
Nao:millan eo., 1966), P• 53. 
�l Noggl.e, �\ � Oil� Politic• !tl !l.!! 1920•s (Uew 
York: w.w. Norton a �, me:; l�, P• 170: 
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The promotion, rather than t..rie regulation of business seSTied to be the 
chief noliey or bot.h Harding and Coolidge, with Herbert Hoover as Secretary 
of Cetrmeroe. Prosperity returned in 1922 tor some but not for all of the 
people. The tanMra, miners and industrial workers were not part of 
F. Scott Fitsgerald'• •Jan Age." The idea that government should enter 
actively into aooial and economic fields as it had done in the Progressive 
era probably never occurred to either Harding or Coolidge. Coolidge•e main 
phil.oaop}\y of goverrnent vas cpressed in his statelrient that the main 
business of goverment vas bu:siness. This philosophy seams to haVe been 
accepted by Hoover when he became president in 1929. 
The DepreBalon 
A.tter the stock market crash in the ran � 1929 had ushered in the 
Greet Depreaaion, Prestdcit Hoover still thought that the way out ltrY in 
extelXling help to buaineee interests through goverment loans md to 
let the pro8.P8l'it.f't vhiah wu fllq>8Cted to foll.Olf, flow down to the people. 
For thi• J>'D'P011• and to foreatall an avalanche of bankruptcies, the 
Reconstruction Finanoe Corporation was created.6 This was not enough, but 
it waa 110re than _, pnni.oua President had done in a depression. Azq idea 
that the federal gO'Yermtent ahould do anything direc'fay !or the people Who 
might i'ind tbemselvu dest.itute and in dire need was no part of Hoover•s 
philoaophy of gowrment.7 Apparently his business men's cabinet did little 
to persuade him otherw:t.a. Perhaps they vere all of the sane m:tm on the 
6ttofatadter1 l!!! Aluerican P9litical Tra,<lition� P• .303. 
7Hargrove, Presidential Lcadersh:l.2, PP• ll4-15. 
ll 
subject. Mr. Hoover's life story had been sti'ictl.7 Horatio Alger material. 
He had been orphaned at an oarl,y age, reared by relatives, sent t.o school 
t'lhere ho did well and then he had becorne a most successful engineer. He 
had retired at an early age and offered himselt tor government service. 
This service had inc:'.uded the c�airmanship o! the Commission for the Relid 
of Belgiwn (1914), :?cod Administrator for the u.s. (1917-18) and Chairman 
ot tho American Relief Admtnistration for Europe (1919) • Ho had also 
been Secretary 0£ Co:>.merce, as previously mentioned. His beliefs in 
private enterprise, efficiency• individualism and substantial laissez-.faire 
in political matters were in Richard Hofstadter's words "All w the 
8 
dominant Aaerican tradition." He apparent]¥ neYW did grasp the econanie 
situation during the depression, alt.11ough to the great majority o£ the 
people it was perfectly clear. They smp]¥ had no ooney nor any honest 
means to get money to buy tho things th.at they needed oost. The depression 
cane as a result of a number of complex faotora, but they all boiled down 
to a lack of effective demarA.--990ple with mney and the willingnass to 
spend it for the goods and services that the country was capable of 
producing. Richard Hofstadter has well daocribed the Hoover Administration 
as the "Crisis of American Individuallam.n9 For the first time great 
numbers or Americans had f aced great hardships and there was no place 
for than t.o eo and nothing for thera to do. Industrialization and urbanization 
had made thal depement upon more than just themselves. They had beoo1ne 
dependent upon each other and, more espec1.al.ly, upon government for a Vll3' 
8nofstadter, !h! American Political Tradition, P• 286. 
9 Ibid., PP• 283-.3J1. 
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out ot their troubles. When state and local gove:rx:warts did not seem ab1e 
to help thela, th ei� attention focused on the fed�al go'V8l'llll911t. 
Positive Govermerl.t. 
New Deal an:l World War II 
On March 4, 19.33 President Franklin D. Roosevelt initiated positive 
government 1n the u.s. in his inaugtn"al address. His view was that it was 
the chief' function of government to do .for the peopJ.e those things whioh 
they could not do for thanselves. He nooded. Congress with bills during 
the f'irst "100 days" calling tor emergency powers for the President and 
the creation of the necessary administrati"'le machinery to get the country 
10 back on its feet,. His main objective wae to use government spending to 
create "Wt>rk and purchasing power for the general population. The New Deal 
for the "forgotten man" may r.ot have been an unqualified success, as IDat\1 
have c1aimed.J but the people 'Who came through the Depression and were ol.d 
enough to remember the conditions which existed then learned one lesaon 
well. The powers of the federal government could be used to advantage 
to restore confidence in our political, social and ecollOOlic institutiorut, 
to ease the ef.f ects of economic crisis and to promote the general welfare 
of the people. 
Be.f'ore the results or the New Deal could be appraised objectiveJ.y, 
var broke out in Europe (September 1939). '!he production or war goods for­
tbe All1ea and our own belated defense preparations tended t.o take up sane 
of the renteining slack in the econcny. Pearl Harbor ended the Nell Deal'• 
tAro 'l908t stubborn probl8Dla.-tmampl.oyment and excess agricultural and 
10Chmes E. Jacob, Leadershl;i f: tee Mew R!al (Englewood Cliffs, 
H.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc. , i967J, PP• .... 2. 
1ndUBtrial productive capacities. L'ven before the war put the economy 
on a f�J'JMllt tull.production basis, one sign.1.:ficant factor had 
already bees1 noticed. Government spend:!ng, ot all the ranedies trl.ed, 
..-ed to have the llCMJt desired eftecta on the economy. When some 
l3 
improvaunt waa noted, Rooaeve.lt cut govemment spending 1n 1937, fol.loving 
charges o£ groaa vute made. during the ca:apa:ign ot 1936, and a downturn 
took pia. 1n 1938. A8 aoon as spending was reaumed the econcm.y turned up 
11 agai.n. 'Die leeeona ot the New Deal were not f'orgottm during the war. 
While the WC' was s1Ail.1. in progress various measures were considered 
to avoid the recesalon wh1eh in the past bad tEllded to follow wars. 
The problem vaa a ntajOJ' Oil$• liot � would jobs have to be f owxi for 
the majority of � 12 million men ard women returning from service, jobs 
for n10st et those -.ployed in war industries vould have to be found aa 
well. 'l'he Full � Act of 1946 was the final result. It in effect 
declared that it would be the reeponsibil1ty of tM federal government to 
foster or to create co!¥lit.iorls ot f\111 E111Splo311ent for all ot those able to 
work and dutroua of the opportunity to do so. In effect that act plus 
other social legislation put the governnaent into the econ<XJzy' and into the 
aoci.al field to stay. This is not surprising, since the government had in 
effect run the economy during tha war and the machinery (the bureaucracies) 
was already in existence to continue to do so with scne modi.tications. 
Cold War 
Since the war, the eeonany has been modified frcin a war-capitalist 
econoay to our present form of "democratic capitalism" which in short means 
�ofstadter, The American Political Tradition, PP• ,3Lo..JU.. 
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adapting the economy to the greatest benefit o.f all in  support or the new 
philosophy ot the •ltare ertate. GoV91'1'1IHl'lt owncr8hi p or the means ot 
production has not beerl oonsidered at all neces�, except 1n special 
ca88s (TVA Atoroic Ezwrogy, etc.) Where only the government. can supply the 
resourcaa. assuu the rJ.*8 and detemine the overall pollt1cal1 90Cial. 
and econoad.o objMtivea to be obtained. The great bulk of formel'ly 
government owned plmt.e a1d productive mNnS have pa ssed into private hands. 
�l'nmmt part.icipdian in the economy 90 far since World War II has been 
limited to tiaoal. pol.Ur', unagement of the moiw;y supply am the 
�� ot pnbllo peU.ey gt11delines and objectiYes. It still remains 
to be 988Jl it this Ulld.ted parlieipation is sutticient in view or the .tact 
�t the international Ii tuation hae kept the 8COl'kJll'l1' on a semi-war .tooting 
w:l.t.h the Korean centllot, � Vietnaw war and other international 
CGIRitroenta. The preeen:t, rather high rate or unemployment 8l'Vl t.he 
increasing inn•td.on eould requiN et.ronger meuuree. OUr experience hae 
provided the neeNN17 MA9Ul"9•, but it ie largely • political. question 
aa to whethal' ctr not they may be used. 
SllJllHl"Y 
This ra ther lengthy sketch of the origins of our present big 
government is necessary to understand the caapl.ete change in political. 
ideology Which occurred in this country in the years between 193.3 end 1946. 
This has been the most significant change in democratic ideology in the 
twentieth century; and in the ease of the u.s •• it is perhaps the most 
aignifioant change in our 1'istory. Otha dGnOCratic nations have experienced 
the eame change, whether the new 819tan of bl.g government fosters democratic 
capi talisn as in this country, or a form of democratic social.is:i as in 
Great Britain. The advent o! big governmant has not been restrici#ed to 
democratic countries alone. Authorl tarian and totali tarlan syster.ts haw 
likewise :toWld a need tor big goverunent to handle the manifold and complex 
problems tJt 1'l'lOde?'n 1n:ittstrial1�� and tll"banised societies. In America, a 
c1 tiun lllUft stop to think ot the remaining areas in his 11.f'e in which 
the go� hae not 15howri either a direct or an indirect interest.12 
Government be cea894 to be either limited or si..1!p].e. rt is big am complex. 
It is fail' to a.:r that ilhe rise of big govel'l'Jment in America bas been 
the reelll.t of f'otnt principal factors. F11'st, was the necessity t.o use the 
powers of �ent to deal Vi th the social and econooiic prob:t.ans of the 
Depression. Second, was the need for the all-out sf'fort to Vin World War II. 
Third, was the needs tor reconversion ald to prov.:l.de the machinery tor the 
new 11alf'are state. Final.l3 • there was the power and politic al ideology 
pcl.ari.mations between the COJnlll.ist and the non-communist camps and the 
requirement for the u.s. to buttress-up the non-communist countries on a 
global basie. 
12Sarauel. Krislov and IJ.oyd Musolf, The Poll ties 0£ Regulation 
(Bostons Houghton Hifflin Co., 1964), P• l. 
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II. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 
'nle Nature of the Procesa 
The adJdnistratift procen 18 essent1ally th11 related acts and 
events in carr;ing out the tunct1ons of government, when vi..ad as rule­
making1 rule application and adjudicat.ion. With our Constitution providing 
for both separation ot poll8'f8 and shared powers a.>ng the legislative, 
executift am judicial branches, it becomes necessary tie> bring to gether 
limited delegations of those powers 1n a single person or in an organized 
group of persons in order to enable the government to act through that 
person or group. The delegation of powers is ordinarily made by Congresa 
to the head (or heads) of an administrative agency. An administrative 
agency may be defined ae mv governmental authority other than a court 
or a legislative body which haa the power to affect the rights of private 
partd.es through either rulo-maldng or adjudication ar both. Therefore 
administrative agenciee (uaua� temed federal agencies) are a part o£ 
the executive branch or our government. It doea not matter ·whether a 
govenl!tental. authoriV is called an office, a ocazd.seion, a board, an 
authority, an administration, a department, a bureau, or 111fY other rune 
congress may select for it; if it has rule-tnaking or adjudicatory .tunctions, 
1 t is an ag«lcy. Congress tends to look upon the President as its chief 
agent (ohiet administrator). He also has rule-making powers (executive 
orders) am adjudicatory powers (the pardorting power). 
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Clo•1Y aslJOCiated lid.th the operations of administrative agencies is 
a fast grcv1ng bodT of a6ninistrative law. .Adm1.n1strative law may be 
defined as the lav ooneern1ng the powers and procedures of tederal agencies, 
including eapeoiaJ.l1' the law governing judicial review of administrative 
action. This ]Aw CONdalte of constitutional J.sw, statute law, common 
law and �,. made law. The bulk of administrative law relates to the 
delegation of power t.e agencies, tho exercise of power by agencies and the 
review of adminil!Jtrat.tft actions by the courts. Emphasis at present tends 
to focua on rule..,.lking � •djudication and powers closely related to 
1 
those tvo f'unctions • 
.AJiaong the ack of our First Congress wae one to do oanething tor the 
soldiers Who had bfftl disabled during tb.e Revolution. On September 29, 
1789, CongTeas passed a law providing for the payment of pensions to 
"invalids who were vouMed or disabled during the late war" to be paid 
"under such regul.ationa as the President ot the United States may direct.n2 
Of course the Preaident could not do the job himself. He set up an 
administrative agency to formulate the regulations (rules) governing 
eligibility for pensions and to d•termine the v-alidity of' (adjudicate) the 
claims which V9l'e expected to be f"orthoomi.ng. Since that td.me Congrese has 
continuously' produced legislation which had to be implenented through 
federal agencies, utilizing the administrative process. The pattern set 
-
�enneth Culp Dav.is, Administrative Law �  (St. Paul.: 
West Publlabing Co., 1959), PP• tlf2. 
2 �.,, P• 8. 
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by the establishment of the predecessor agency to our present Veterans 
Adainist.ration has been fol.l.ond ever since by congress to establish nil.._ 
making, rule applying and adjudicating agencies. As administrative 
problale have become more C0111pl.ex, CongJ'ess has aought. to define the 
l:i.11its or delegated powers more c:loeely am to set the stcr3.ards for th.U 
usea in a more precise manner than was done in 1769. Congresa has al.ao 
tented to define organiza�nal matters, operational. matt.era and 
jurisdictional matters in a more precise manner for th e  ageneiea &et up 
pursuant to its acts 1n later J&at'S• The lilhole philosophy of using 
agmcies and the administrative process is to UM praetioal mm (appointed) 
to find practical answers to problana Which should be aolved in an efficient 
and eftecti'f'e manner without unnecessary del..81• 
Reasons for IJse 
The principal reason f'or both the increase in the number of f edera1 
agencies and in the increasing use of the administrative process is the 
direct result of our change of concept !ran l.i.raited govornilent to government 
with inherent powers to deal with any and all problms which cannot 
otha:ndse be dealt with expeditiously and adequately. There are additional 
reasons. l"irst, except in mctromel.y limited areas, Congress has never bean 
in a position to legisl.ate in the detail raquired to eliminate the need for 
the use 0£ discret.1.on by the men who will be charged with i ts implanentation • 
.Also, there are certain advantages for Ciongrees and iIXli.ViduaJ. congressmen 
in being able to turn difficult problems over to federal agencies. It 
avoids undue criticism and pressure on congressmen and Congress itselt, and 
it enable.a congressmen to do valuable "case work• on the problem for their 
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con sti tuent.s by intercecling for them with the agencies. Second, there has 
always been a need to bi"ing the federal government cl.oser to the people to 
obtain needed .f'aots and infomation for legislation by Congress and for 
the operation of the agencies, as wl1 as to change the image of the federal 
government from one that is far away from and high above the common people 
to one which has represent4ltives close at hand. 'Jhe present decentralized 
nature of bureaucratic operations by most federal agencies puts bureaucrats 
"out in the field" i n elose competition with the representatives of state 
am local governments for popular attention. Third, the administrative 
process is the most .efficient in the use of time,, men, money and materials 
to accomplish the er:ds which a re sought. It is efficient precisely 
because an agency gi � cognizance over a partieula·r policy or function 
is also delegated suttic:tent powers to deal with the vast maj ority o:f the 
controversies which can be reasonably expected to arise. Given responsibility­
.for a limited !unction of a specific nature, the agency can organize 
itself in the :most efficient manner, the requisite numbers and types of 
specialists and generalist.s can be assanbled• proper divisions o.f effort 
can be made• coo.peratio-n and coordination can be achieved and something 
appro aching assembl.y·line methods can be adapted to accomplish all related 
tes.lcs in the most rational manner. What science there is in public 
administration is best illustrated by t."1e use of the administrative process 
to define the problems, to devise methods for t.heir solution and to solve 
them. Finally# the axperi�e and expertise resulting .from past a.nd current 
operations can be plowed back into the system to improve and re.tine :future 
operations' in the same al'ea in an on-going dynamic fashion. 
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Chief Criticiems 
The increased use of the administrative process has not been without 
its critics. The criticians center aroum two major contentions. The 
first is the objection of 8Qme to being subjected to rules made by men 
vbo are not legislators and to adjudicatioms made by men vho are not 
judges. That those men might be lawyers as well as bureauCl"ats doee nDt 
lessen the objectJ.on. These objectors might be termed the nruJ..e by law" 
men who dulre that what administrators are allovec:l to do be spelled out 
in detail in statute law 90 that aivone (if he happens to be a lawyer) 
might htn9 a good understanding ot ju.st What he could or could not do 
without haring to be told by a bureaucrat. The crux o£ their objection 
is the degree of diecretion usually allowd to admin1etrat.ors1 both as t.o 
rule-mald.ng and rule adjudication. This complaint has subsided somewhat 
over the years, but in the l930's it was rampant. Professor Davi.a has 
caught the essence of this complaint and the reasms £or it in a partioulal3 
illuminating article.3 
'fhe other major contention is that some agencies, and particularly 
the independent regulatory commissions, are airnp1y not doing the j.ob. 
Concerning the agenal.u noainally under the oontirol of the President, the 
contention is • lack of central organization, direction and control. to 
avoid duplication of eff'ort,. work at cross purposes and other deficiencies 
eusceptibl.e to oerr-ection by gi'Ving more power to the President to 
reorganize the whole executive branch bureaucracy and to prov.i.de gllidance 
\:enneth Culp Davis, 11Reaaon.s for Opposition to the Administrative 
Process" in The Politics � �at;:ton, ed. by Samuel Krlslov and Uoyd 
Musolf (Bostons lJOugntOn, H · n  Co.1 1964), PP• 47-SJ.. 
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tor all units. Every study of the eDCutive branch ot our go�t has 
ad'VOCated more power to tJle President to any out the duties which Re 
constantly piled upon h1Ja.4 There must be a good NaSOn why the Preeident 
lula not been given the recommended powers, and there is one-politics. 
Congresa has only' � given t11all incranents ot paw.- to the 
President; to rearrange the bureaucracies, vhioh it cnated and considers 
its own for the most pet. 
There m-e two specllications to the charge against the regulatory 
agencies that they Q'e not doing the job. First., they sre not subject to 
even nominal contl"ol by the President and Congress has set them adr1£t 
in a poli�ical sea 111.thou\ adequate navigational aids. Second, th.t without 
adequate guidanoe troa Congress and a sense � direction .from t.he Prea:ident, 
they have been "captured" by the ver.r interest that they were sent out 
to regulate. Professor Bernstein has described the position of the 
regulatory 1tgenc1es am their major problma .-1.d £allure$ in a constructive 
criticisn before a comMittee of Congreaa.> Here again the main reason 
that the comdssions are not doing the job is politics. The regulated 
interests like the arranganents just a s  they are, and the regulated 
interests (or the interests which arc suppoeed to be regulated) are 
powerful poll tical.ly. Richard O�.f, President Cleveland ' s  Attorney General, 
4See especially the President•s Committee on Administrative 
nanagementt t;:rt with !dial Studies (Washington, n.c.s u.s. Government Printing Off ce• 19,7)� Cornm!sS!On on Organization or the Executi-,. 
Branch or GoV91"11Dent1 � �th mcp.al Taek !!m � (Washington1 
n.c . 1  u.s. Government --Of�ee. !94'"'8n<rl955:over Commission 
Repotts). 
�arvar Bernate� "The Comnisaioms Have Failed, • in � :J:�ep� 
R,ul.ato;rz A�enciea, ed. by Leon Salomon (New York1 The H.  
!9 9), PP• �:::00. 
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marked out th9 ow '-· ._ ngulated interests, when he wrote to the 
president ot • . � ..., had aome reservat.iqna abo&lt regulation by the 
New Intern.• Ct9{111• CJ1 1l•ion. Mr. Olney' statAd in his letter baek 
in 1892• 
• • _ • �' Qc '-' •ll• • • . is, GJ' can be m•de of great use 
to the r� It aeUstied popular clamor fc;yr 
IO'f'•••t. � � %'ailroacle, et "118 ame t.ima 
the �  b entirely nominal. Furthei-, the older 
• "m;I ....... '° bet ta.. •re it w1ll be tourd to 
t8k• the bu!Ma and rail.Nad view ot things. It thu.s 
bee•• a .... et Nn1er between the railroad corporations 
and h � ll1d • 90l't of protection agairurt hasty 
em _... 1.....,.t&on heetU.. to railroad intel'eata. • • • 
'ft'l9 pU't o� vt.tm is not to destroy the eonn1ssion but 
"° •\flt• "-0 
Attome1 0..-lt'l OlMy was stating an opinion of the Nell Interstate 
Commeree � tbd eubeequent experience haa largel.;r confirmed as a 
£8a'b.1 
Place in Our Government 
It .... � saf'e to say that the adi:ainistretiw process and 
the bu:NaUONtlo �el qenciea are with wt to at.ay. With the pluralistic 
polltieal NltuN ot OU" 80Ciety the process see.ms to offer the best 
opportumty fbr their interplay and the achievement of reasonably effective 
progrme and poliai.ee over the years. O! course the process tends to be 
biased in f'nor ot those interest. �ups Which are organized and capable 
and will.1ng tie pwJt1 their int e rests, but one lld.ght also observe that 
'i:ttchard Olne71 quoted in Davis, Admini8&rat1 ve !:,!! Te�, P• 7. 
7 Sauel P • Huntington, "The Maramus of the ICCi The Commission, 
the Railroads and the Public Interest" in Public Adnr...nistration and 
Polley, ed. by Peter Woll (New Yorks Harper 'aiit G, Db6j 1 p: W. 
politics i.s also the organization of bias (values). Such protection as 
the public interest recei vos in t•1e adrti.n:!.strati ve process is largely 
2) 
dependent upon the good j•ldgtt1ent of t,,he appointed officials and top career 
men vho must run the arcneie:s in a po1.i. tie ally charged c..'W'i....roment. 
Senator Robert A. ':.'art, whom no one would have accused of being a 
proponent ot big �. nevarthel.ens helped amend the Hational Labor 
Helatione Aot ot l9lS to make labor urdone amenable to the laW ant1 
accountabl.o tor tbelr •ettons. 8 
A nUllber ot ].ea.ding politicians aT¥i "Public o£f'ic1w, Repu.blioans 
and Dnocrata al:f ke1 aa well aa scholars, have expressod their general 
appl"Obatdon of adalniatrat1ve aceneiea and tho adninL�ati ve process. 
Attorney o.n.r.i Herbert Brownell gq>.reseed the general sentiment on the 
subject in 19SS when he wrote• 
Adalinistrati ft agencies have becwme a part c4 our 
constitutional covemment, accepted by Congress, the 
judiciary am the people as an ea8GJ\t1.al part ot our 
go�ent otructure. They were C?"oated as a necessary 
mHJl8 £or 1U"'Otecting public in�sts vhich could not 
be 11Uitably !)rotooted by the eourtn or othOl' means. 
Adndnist.ratiw agenciee must be pel'laitted to ft,nction 
ef'£'1cient� and eff'ect:tvely 1f' the ,ublie intaNst,9 
Vhioh is t.� primary concern, is to be preael"98d. 




� • La bot }� .. nt �ati®S Act ('l"8.£.� Hartley Act) us 924!, 
•101. xdTJC, .�e. 1 aJ ( 2). 
9nerbert Brownell, quot.00 1n :1av:ls,, Administrati,ve !-!! Tro.."t, 
PP• lB-19. 
III. FIIDERAL AGENCY OPERATIONS 
General 
Organization 
Agencies have been brought into being whe'l there has been a need 
tor government to enter into a new area or our society to deal with 
either old or nw problems. The Social Security Adnrl.n:istration is an 
exattple of the creation of an agency to deal with a problem as old as 
societ1 itself'. The Federal Conrnunieaticms C0111T1ission is an example 
ot an agency brought into being to deal vi th one of the problems ot 
advanoing technolGgy. The agencies are usually c�eated by Congress at 
the t1me a particular act is passed requiring the use of the administrative 
prooeas tor its implementation. At other times, under the press of war 
or nat.1.onal. emergency. almost blanket authority has been £9.ven to the 
President to create agencies by executi 'Ye order to carry out functions 
essential to the national eff'ort.1 Old agencies have been abolished when 
the need !err them has ceased or their functions haw been transterred to 
other ag'8ncies or new agencies have absorbed old agencies as well as their 
fumtions. Several of our present executive departlnents began as agencies 
or ofi"ices and were later raised to departmental level. The Depal'bnent or 
Justice is an early example. Same departments, when they were formed, 
lsee First War Power., Act, Statutes � LaIJe,, LV, sec. 838 
(l9hl).  
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have incorporated one or more agencies already in existence into their 
O?'ganinations. The Department of Heal th Education and Welfare is an 
axample or such incorporation of existing agencies. The question of just 
which units of organization are agencies and which are not is not an easy 
one to answer. If a unit (bureau, office, administration, etc. ) makes rules 
to implement legislation or it has the power to adjudicate controversies 
arising under the application of rules, it is an agency. It would then 
follow that s001e of the larger agencies are canposed � macy smaller 
agencies, and indeed that is true. For example, the Department of HEW 
has nine major units, each under an assistant secretary. One of those 
units is the Social Security Administration, forrnel"ly an independent agency 
created to ir.iplcment the Social Security Act of 1935. It now has t'our sub-
units, one of which is the Bureau or Old Age Assistance and Survi"VOr 
Insurance. That bureau maintains millions of records and handles m1.ll1ona 
2 of claims each year. 
Staffing 
'nle f'ederal agencies are starred �m tvo main sources-political. 
appointees and the cm-eer service. 'nle President and his major appointees 
oan make ap to about 1200 political appoint.menUI to positions invo.lftd in 
policy making. Thia does not mean that all of these appointments are made 
at each change of administration, but it does mean that the President can 
fill sensitive political spo'ts in the various agencies and offices with his 
own men, or men who share his political. outlook and values. Approximately 
510CX> "super grade" career personnel with long experience or high 
2icenneth Culp Dav.ts, Administrative Lav Text ( st. Paul: West Publishing eo., 1959),  P• 4 . - -
protesaional qualifications (most usually both) man the top posts in bureaus, 
staff sectiona and elsewhere in the agencies, where experience, expertise 
am prof eslional qualifications are at a pradum. Bureau chie.t is considered 
a particul.arly suitable assigment by such men.3 
Delegations of Power 
Delegations of power to make rules and to adjudicate controversies 
are made to agencies by Congress in connection with the particular act 
requiring administration. The National Labor Relations Act produced the 
National Labor Relations Board for example. The original objections to 
the <lelegation o.r powers, as such, have all but disappeared. The controlling 
thoueht today in our courts is that Congress must set reasonable limits to 
such delegations and set reasonable standards for their uses. The Supreme 
Court has never found a delegation of power by Congress to a l'egularl.y 
constituted administrative agency invelid.
4 
This has not been tl"\18 o£ 
delegations of power to the President in tvo instances during the New Deal.S 
Congress is seldom able to enact other than broad general policy 
Which requires "filling in the details" by an agency or the President. 
There is more than one advantage to that procedllro. or course it saves 
time and effort required to legislate in more detail; but perhaps more 
important, it avoids the necessity to nueter majorities on controversial 
)John J. ·)arson and R. Shale Pa�, !l!!l Ji!!!: � !2E_ (Wash., D.C.1 
The Brookings T. stitution, 1967), PP• 1;.-S. 
4see Davis, Administrative 1!! Text, P• 32. 
S
Sae Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 u.s. 388 (1935) and 
Schecter Poultry Corp. v. u. s ., 295' u.s. 495 (1935).  In each case 
Congress failed to set any limits to the delegation of power to the 
President or to prescribe adequate standards for its use. 
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details which tend to put congressmen in embarrassing positions with the 
people back home• Aleo there is political capital to be made during the 
ilnplementatJ.on of the policy by an agency, which might well have been 
lost by commitment to more datails original.l.y. In this roapeot the 
federal agencies could be vie-wed as agonts of congress to resolve 
6 
oonfllcts among interest groups as well as agents to put law into eff eot. 
Principal Operations 
The operations ot all agencies fill under the three general 
headings of rule-making, rule application mci adjwiication, each of which 
involves poll tics in administration. 
The procedures for rule-r.1aking by a�encioa vaey widely, but all leave 
some tt>om for outside participation. The procedure to bo followed is 
left largely up to the discretion and the political sense o£ the agency 
head, or heads in the case of commissions and boards. UsualJJr rule-.imaking 
1nvo1ves consultation with the parties to be affected. The consultation may 
take place in the form of a conference, requests for written presentations, 
open hearings, arguroent he:irings and even trial type hearings, depending 
upon the nature of tho subject matter tor which rule making is required. 
After tentative rules are made provi8ions exist for publication and 
deterred dates of effectiveness to permit petitions £or changes. In 
addition to the agency's efforts to be fair aI¥l realistic in establishing 
rules, cognizant cocnnittees of Congress often like to review the proposed 
6E. Pendleton Herring, Public Administration and the Public Interest 
(New York: HcGraw Pill Book Co., gJ5), PP• 6:§. - -
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rules tor aJY political implications as well as to cheek on the agency's 
ability to interpret the "will of Congress." In many cases tJi.e opinion of 
the Attorney General may be requested on proposed rules as to legality 
or oth er matters. It ia sufficient to ••Y that rul.8-aald.ng 18 legislation 
in a na.."TOw sense and for a pert:!.eular purpose 1 authorized by Congress Vi th 
representation of all interests fully allowed. 1 
Rule Application 
J'.19[!,islation by Congress iS best achieved by making basic policy 
and laws relating t,o categories o! things and classes ot persons tor 
broad political, economic or social objeatiws. The main functions of 
agencies is to apply general policy or law to particular cases. 'lh.e 
8"1eraee citimen is not intei-ested so much in vhat an act of Congress MY8 
as he is in how it might apply to him, personally'. Of course he has vague 
ideas (or reus) ot how it might applJJ but al'ter the rules are made, he 
has a much better idea. It the rules can be made cl.ear and understandable 
the majority of the people will obey them by habit. Compliance is the 
principal objective in rule appllc•t1on. Self entorci.ng type rulas are 
favored, if the matter being administered vill permit such rules. It 
seldcm does, and supervision id required to ensure compliance. The 
SlJ!>&rvision serves two purposes. First, it G11Courages compliance; amt 
eeoond, it may disclose any shortcomings or inequities in the rules, 
t;hmeel"fttm. In the course ot euperviaion, it may also be necessary to 
7see Davis, Administrative � Text, Chapter 6. 
give advisory opinions and to issue declaratory orders to let people 
knm1 where t.hey stand in relation to tho law, including what the'IJ oan or 
cannot do and still be safel.y Within the law. The whole id.ea is to lead 
8 
the people into compliance rather than to torce them. 
Adjudication 
Despite the care 'With which a({encies make and apply rules, questions 
will arise both as to the applicability or the rules and the fairness ot 
decisions made under them in particular cases. The power to adjudicate 
controversies arising from either source is usually included in grants of 
power to agencies, especially to the regulatory agencies. \1f11ether or 
not power to adjudicate is specifically granted,. it is usually assumed to 
have been made short of the power to impose sanctions, and all agenci.. are 
involved in adjudicating to some degree, at least in the informal manner. 
Like ru.le-aald.ng, adjudicating is of special interest to the courta, as 
wll as to the parties wbich may be involved or affected. Consequently, 
the agencies operate very carei"Ully in this area to avoid Violation of any 
private rights. The procedural sateguaro. of notice, hearing, right to 
coanael., crosa exanination, exanination of evidence and others are oare1'UllJr 
obsened. This is not to sug�est that a court room atmosphere prevaUe at 
all. In practice such adjudications are uaual.ly made quite 1.ntormfll.]3 in 
• oonterenoe-like a1imosphere, Where everyone can be heard with no 
exclusion of what he has to say. Settlement by mutual consent is the 
course nost. favored by agencies, courts and the parties involved. 
8see Davis, Administrative � Text, Chapter 4. 
It it beooaee neeesury to conduct ·• tomal hemng trc. vtd.ch om 
aide is expeoted to appeal on pointa of law, equity or for other reuone, 
great care is taklen to ensure that the record is cmpl.ete and includes all 
presentations of briefs, oral arguments, tfftimol\V' arxi all other matter 
which may poaaihly be relevant. Some cases do etKl up in the courts, but 
this is the exoep\ion rather than the rule.. The rule ia thn •genci• 




All federal agencies have considerable support .trem the inst.ituUon 
which created them-Congress. Likewise they have support from the President, 
the Supreme Court and important segments of the population. Presidents 
have not usually been overly eritieal of the agencies for the way they do 
their jobs. The Supreme Court has usual.ly supported agency operations by 
exercising self-restraint in reference to their operations, so long as 
constitutional boundaries and botmdaries to personal rights have not been 
crossed. However, thia is seldom enough. Unlesa agencies can win general 
pUbllc approval. and specific approval b"om t.he groupa with which t.hey' deal, 
primarily, the feedbaok tr<:n their operations reaching Ccmgreaa, the Pres:i.dent 
aJ¥l the courts tends to undermine the institutional support. � were 
original.l.Y given. Perhaps the most :import.ant tuk for political executives 
is to aaintain and build up instittttional su� by gaining popular 
9See Peter Woll• �r19!!1 Bureaucracz (New Yo:rica w.w. Norton Co., 
1963) 1 Chapter ). 
support £':rorn �ortant segments ot the pUbllc. !he FBI, rcrr ex8Dple, 18 
an institution itself. J. F.dgar Hoover has headed the FBI longer thm 
most Americans can remenaber. He has � w.ner eight presidtmts. 
Since the goverll'l19nt bears upon the citi.zens through the agenciee 
Which are manned at the higher levels by bureaucrats, the v1nn1ng of 
popular support ia moet important. Kl.ected otticers have constituents, 
and so do the agencies. Congress and the Presl.dent like t,o reintorce 
success by gi"f'ing more support to agencies which are doing • good job and 
have public support also. The political operations should be conducted 
by the agency heads to be the most ef'tectift. Ns does not mean 
partisan politics, but the politics of getting along with the people in 
and out of govert1V1ent vho count insofar as the agency' s principal operations 
are concerned. Since mo:rt. political encutives are mv chosen fctr 
professional. competence rat.her than political. experience, the eareer 
bureaucrats who know all the pitfalls along the political trails can be 
most helpful with timely advice conoerning who to ""• when an:l for what.10 
Resolving Connicts 
The sources ot contlicts tor agencies are lftC\Y• First of all there 
i s  boum to be a certain tm0unt of connict within the agency 1tsel.t• 
despite the beet eftorte to control it. tho f'!rst task for the political. 
executi- is to get his mm houee (age�) in oni.z.. tJnl.ess this is done, 
not much else can be done. Not only •eency heads but cabinet members 
9Clletim&e tail in this important effort. The recent change o! secretaries 
10Franc1s E. Rourke, Bure!ucr1oz1 P�tics arxi Public; Policz 
(Boeton1 Little, Brown am &. ,1'.969), p ;1!:95.-
of Ii»/ seems to illustrate this Point.11 The reaol.utrion of confllcts 
arising in cormecti.on with an agency' s operations are to be expected. 4lhey 
can usually be reaolved to the satisf'acti.on of all paiot:f.ea concerned � 
political capital. can be made simply from doing the job well. Diasatis:taetion 
among an agency's clian't;s and frequent appeals and reeorta to oourt actions 
do nothing to add to the political capital of en agenoy or its head. 
Finally, there are conflicts aoong agencies aver jurisdictions and 
boundaries. Congress has not aJ.wqe been care!ul to prtmmt ovarlapa 
and duplications. These conflicts take two forms. One fol"m has been 
called "bureaucratic imperialism" after the attempts of a>me agencias to 
take over some of the functions of other agencies.12 The other form, much 
more common, might be called "diffused responsibility." It is well 
illustrated by the fact that no less than aeventeen other agenciaa 
besid&s HEW have sane responsibility in the field o£ educatian.1' 
Resolution of conflicts in either of these areas requires a high degree 
or poll tical skill to survive and to do the job wn. 
Pr<Doting Legithlacy 
A&e?lGY ope.rations do have some effect on promoting the l.egitdmacy 
of the federal government. The outll'ilt& of goverment, for the IQOst par1;, 
ll,..F:inch steps Down-To the White House. tt Nev.fl!!.!!!!. June 15• 1970, 
PP• 24-2$. 
l2t�hev J. Holden, "lliperialism in Bureaucraey1" .Ame:rie411 PoUtisA 
Science J!!5•• LX (Dec. 1966) 1 943-51. 
l)Richa?'d BoJ11ng, PO!!!£ � th! f!ogae (Nw York• E.P. Dutton and 
Co., Inc., 1968), P• 263. 
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.tlov thr®gh agencies; and the wey the agencies handle their jobs aid the 
peopl., with whom they deal.1 more or less d:ireotJ.y, can ha-ve a decided 
effect upon whether or not those people eee the goverment as one Whioh 18 
meeting their needs. Of course suoceesf ul operations help to create a 
legitimacy for· the agencies, themselves. Since the a<mtnt. of TV politics, 
it ia not uncommon at all tor the people to eee and hear important 
bureaucrats discuss some of the aspects and problans of their work to 
further a .tavnrable image ot their particular agenciee. The Conmd.aaionezo 
of Internal Re'V9nue has used the fil'st page of the i.ncome tax instructj.ona 
to explain the task that his agency faces and to enlist the cooperation 
of all taxpayers in order to do the job well. lk 
Legislative Proposal.9 
The first harxl aperience g&i.ned frQQ the irllplenaemation o.t 
legial.a1d.on often leads the agenoi.es to suggest legisl.Rive changes to 
clar1l7 t.he law or to •end it to blreaden 1 ta aco�. In some casea 
entirel.7 new proposal.a mq be. o.ti'ered. Such proposals are most lik&l¥ to 
t4ce the moat ".fr.ienil¥" route.15 U Congre88 or the particular committees 
hariJlg cognizmce over the agwy ea particularly impNs8ed with the 
agency's operations or the progret being adairdatered.1 the legislation 
might well originate in Congress. In other cases, it could originate in 
the execut.iw branch ae part o� the President' s  program. and in certain 
lASheldon s. Cohen, "A PerBODll 1-tter trom the Conauisai.oner ot 
Internal Revenue�" Fed.ral InCOt.r18 Tax Fo1'DlS � 1967 (Wash., D.c.s 
u.s. Treasury Depariiiiilt, InternallteVenue sern.ce;:i.?67), P• l. 
l5See J. Leiper Freeman,, The PoUtical Processa Executive Burea� 
Legislat.1.ve Comnittee Relationa.�v. ea. U1ew forka Random House, 1965), 
cilapter L'.. 
cases it might originate in the aeency itsel.f'. In any case the agency plays 
a most important part in the initiatio'l of any lf3t,."'islation covering matters 
under its cogni z �mce. In soTlle cases bills have 1leen oricinate<l by asencies 
and s;x>nsored through Congress by the agency. William I,. Cary gives a good 
account of sueh a bill sponsored by the S� during his chairmanship (1961-
1964) .  Even though tho bill was considered oon-controvorsial., it took 
considerable time to eet it through CoJ'l8reS$• The bill was the Secu�ities 
Aet Amendment of 1964 (P.L. 88-467, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 31642, August 20, 
1964) .  While there was no real oppooition to it, there was no great 
support for it either.16 
Political A8pecta of Operat.ions 
This discussion of tederal agency operations has been presented to 
indione the political nature of all auch operations, including operations 
vitidn the agenci.es themaelwa. Agencies are the distributors of advant.gea 
(benetiu) and disadvantage• (oosta) to people. Much of how this is to be 
done ie decided politicall.7, f'int at the highest l.evel and then at the 
agenq l.8'991. cne could "1• the level of congressional canmittee-agency­
interest group as 11conpartmmtal.111ed" democracy, except that not all 
significant groups in Al'lerica are organized interest groups, which oan push 
their intcmsts into the political al"9nB and protect them. The black, the 
poor, the ,oung end the old are exantpl.es ot sign1.f1.cant groups which do not 
enjoy the same access as do soote of the more arnuent, organized and 
articulate groups. Nevertheless it is fair to s1zy that the agencies are in 
the center of the political arena and subject.ad to political pressures tran 
all sides at all times. 
l.65ee William L. Cary, Politics am fue Regulato!7 .Agencies (New 
York i McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967), Ch apter'""'!;; 
IV• BURF.AUCRACY AND DEMOCRACY 
Democratic Contributions 
As Madison said in F•ral.16't !1§, our form of govez'2ll!Mmt 1e e 
representative republic (eorustitutional democracy) v.i.th • vstan 0£ 
eh9cka and balances and separated and 5hared powere. According to our 
nomative concepts, such a govermant shoul<i be representative, 
responsible and accountable for its actions to the people. Yet we 
are all veil aware �t the persons who obviously have the most to do 
with the carrying out of g0'99nmMmt funetiona 08 politica1 awointees 
or emreer people. At best they are only indirectly aocountable to the 
people through the elected official.a. Nnvthelaae. it is suggested that 
the bureauerata,, political and career .Uke, help to f'ul.f'ill the 
normative requirement for a const.itution-1 democracy in a most satiefactory 
manner. This is true not only because bureaucrats share thoee concepts, 
but also because the great majority ot the people with whom they deal 
also share then and expect the go"Yertnent to behave accordingly. Paul 
Appleby summed it up well when he said, u.An inditsenous bureaucracy is in 
mmv' delicate and important ways a reneetion of its societq • ..1 
Representation 
Representation involves access to goverment to make needs and 
demands known. An individual or a group which does not have access to 
1i>aul Appleby* Policy and Adnd.nistrati,on (Tuscaloosa, Ala. i 
UniVf..>rsity of Alabama Press, m11. P• �1. 
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aovel'l111Slt through some element of our political syatan i8 mt likely to 
be rep1'8eented to arq marked degree. There are 11181\Y paths or aeceSBs 
political. pertioa, elected representatives, the oourte, intereS"t; f:.TOUpa, 
pressure groups and "the appropriate bureaucracy-if there happens to be 
ona. The more Tle.ln8 of access an individual or group has the 111)?'8 
likaly that one or oore of them Will be able to represent their interests. 
The new departllant.8 of Hml and HUD have opened 8'V9lllleS or access � 
individuals am groups which before lacked any real access. Congress 18 
un:iar the control of the standing co::nitt&ea and particularly the 
chairmen of such cor.md.tteea. Consequently Congress haB not bean 
repreeantati ve of national interests as much •s it has beSl ot sectJ.anal 
and parochial interests. B�aucraciea, which do not. have paroohial. 
lean:tngs, are often more representative than Co�ss 1n the national 
( publl.c) into:rest. 2 Thero are two ad:vanta[.'es to seeking representation 
of interests through agenc::ies. First the agency (tor good public relation8) 
is recap-ti 'ft and � be able to solve the pn>blan on the spot. Second, 
it the age114y cannot solve the problem, although it is _,parently one 
for which it teals responsible, it can represent the interest to Congress 
or to the President in a most e.fi'ective mannel". 
Responsiveness 
A bureaucracy having a narrow range o£ interests and responsibilities., 
compared to Conereaa� co."l'Wittee chaimen, or congrenmen, is likely to 
be more receptive and responeiT• to problems wxler its cognisance. One 
2tlort.on E. Lonaj •Buiteauoracy and Conatitutd.onaliaa," .Aroeri.can 
Political Science Rev:lw, XLVI (Sept. 1952), PP• 608-18. 
37 
can well imagine the response that proponents or Negro voting rights in 
tJ1e South eoul.d have expected from Southern senators am Congressmen-none. 
The s- was true in the case of school desegregation as well as redistricting 
. . 
by state lAIUlatun!s. The Supreme Court and the Deparlment of Justice 
proV8d much more respomD.va to the needs in eaeh case. Many more exanplea 
could be clted to indicate tJl8 responsive nature 0£ bureaucratic agencies. 
llm-MUCl'&cd.n do not necessarily wait. until a problem is poeed to 
them to become reeponaive. In the course of agency operatd.ons, intelligence 
is ga1ned � problems which are develDping or seem 11lcely to d9\'9l.op. 
In either 08H th• agency can take action by expanding its operations to 
include new pnbll•u,, or by requesting additional power f\rom Congress to 
deal with them. Aside fro;; the ability to forsee problems, agencies also 
have the ability to foresee the needs o:f the clients or groups w-lth which they 
are dealing and, in many cases, to art.-Lculate these needs in a more efi'ective 
r.ianoor than would otherwise be possible. This is especially true for the 
benef'it agencies lacking pressure group olientelas. 'l'he bureaucrat, no 
less than the soldier, likes to be in control of the situation around him 
insofar as that is possible. 
Responsiblell9ea 
In the senae of holding a fomal organizational role, charged with 
particul.ar duties and entrusted with the power to act. bureaucrats tend 
to act most responsibly. There are a mmber of reasons why this is true. 
r�irst, the hierarchical arrangem&nt of bureaucracies and thoir methods of 
record keeping make it extrernely difficult to cover up 1rresponsib1e behavior. 
Second, both political am career bureaucrats have too much to lose to 
r.Ldc nd.abehaT1or fOl' their own advantages. The Prttaident can nmove any 
0£ his appointees for gross :misbehavi-0r, forthwith. His appointees can 
remove any career bureaucrats for the saite reason. Neither elected 
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officials mr judges are subjected to ret!training influences to the same 
degree as bureaucrats. In theoey am in practice the Pre:rl.dent is responsible 
far all of those serving under him in the m:ecutive branch , including of 
couroe all met!lbers or the armed .forces J and in turn they a.re accountable 
to him and to the officers appointed over them. 
The responsibility o£ administrators does not end with ti'le President.3 
Most administrators are slt.ialded by several lqers of bureaucr"ac.y b:'om 
the direct attention o£ the President . '.nlB political SXBcu'M.ves appointed 
by the Pros:i.dent to the top posts and their Aare or lass personal. appointees 
!'eel the greatest responsibility tiO the President. t.fost or the raaaining 
adlnin:1strators probably feel a greater sense o£ reaponaibility to Congress 
and to their ellenta and constituem;a. Ageaci.es are alao reepon8il4e to 
their stalls and to tbanaelws to formulate rational pl.ans and prooediJrel 
and tor carrJ1l1g than in1'b effeat. They owe eome degrM ot responaibili ty 
to other agencies with whi.oh they must cooperate and coordinate their 
activlties to achieve their goals. With responsibilities owed in so marw 
directions, it would foll.ow that bureaucrats are inelined to behave with a 
high degree of circumspection and care. 
Aocountabilltq 
While bureaucraciee and blreauorate an not aocoun1;able 'bo th e  people 
dinctJy, they 0e ac.eountabJ.e to the President who in tum is aeoountable 
'itiohard Neua� f!re�,J.1,!l PME (New Yorks John Wile7 and 
Sons, mo .. , l96o), P• 39. 
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to the people. In theoey the President is oot responsible for the actions 
of those under him, but in political practice he is often held so .  In 
this sense bureaucrats, especially t.11o:Je at the highest lewls, might be 
coruddered much more accountable to all of the peo�o than any senator or 
COilflresS!l8n who is elected by a local e.l.ectorate. Of course a few 
bureauorate. some in high places, have not resisted the temptation t.o 
profit personally fran the power entrusted to theln. Usually such pers:>ns 
are allowed to resign, but in some eases they have been disrdseed by the 
4 President; ani in extraae eases th91 have served prison t.erma. Acy id.ea 
that a citizen might have that bureaucrats are not accountable should be 
forgotten. Accountability extends all the wrq down to the lesser bureaucrats 
as wen. 
Checks am Balances 
Agencies der.1-.. all or their powers .trca Congress. �,. share 
powers with the President and the courts only to the mctent that Cangreu 
ahees such powera. Hovevor1 there are important checks and balAnce8 on 
ABalOY' actions. 
Rel.atione with the President 
The President ia generally assmited to be the head of the erre1re 
bureaucracy or the ueeut.ive branch. 1'11s is true only in a nordnal sense. 
The agencies (bureaucracies) do not owe their existence to the Presiclant. 
They were crcatAd by acts of Corlgre88 llhiah almo gave than statutes to 
adnti!rl.ster and the reaources with vhich to do eo. Ex:cept tor those 
Lpar • good account ot eablnet level scatldals aee Burl Noggle, 
�eaac?t Date& Oil and Polities iri. the l220ie (New Yorks w.w. Nort<,n ard 
o:;I9�J. - - - -
btu-eancracies directly under the Pre81dent, such as those 1n the Executive 
ottice of the President and thoH mder cabinet ottioera• Congress shares 
eontrel with the Preffi.dent and in most oases congressional influence 
dcni:n&tea. Thi• is particularly' true in re� to the regulatory 
commissions. 'fhe greateet power t.lte President has • .._,,. the bt.n-eauc:sraey 
is the po119r to �to com1nce the bure•crK8 that llhat. he wants 
tlwlt to do is really 1ll:ult they shou1d do as the best course tor then in 
their awn ael.t interest and that of the public•' It is extr� dang-erous 
tor • bureauc:rat to � the President in an obstinate manner. He 1e 
usually incl:1ned to l:l.8ten VflrY eare.ful.l7 to what t.he President has to 
aay and to Wonder vh.t the PNa:l.clent might do it h18 advice is not 
f ollewed. The Presidalt cm always .to.roe a careful reconsideration of arq 
action being eontmplatsl by a �ucrat, and he ean of eo1lfte cut badge\ 
requests 01" wi. thhold ame.r already appropr1ate4 as diSllPFO"f9d ot deviant 
behnior. What the President can do for the top bureaucrats, his appointed 
political axecuti�, especially eabinet o.fficers, can do for lesser 
bureaucr.ats. 
Rel.ation1 'iii th Congft!Sa 
Congre88 bo1d11 the real power over the bureaucraoiee. rt created 
theM am it eould, 1.f' neceasary, abol.ie any one of th•• Moreo"nlr, 
Congress .tunii.US the rea�es f • tneiJt operatiom and suppliu the 
statntee am chie1' polieie• tor them to adld.ntster. It is not surpr'lsmg 
t-hat a good ,.rt ot most burea\lel'ata• tj.me is .tocused ott congren.1.onal 
6 
relat1one. Congress sh.area with the agenc1•• the task of administering 
prograns. Every agency has at least tHO committees in eaoh house of 
Congress with more than a casual interest 1n what the agency is doing or 
not doing in oanyi.ng out the "will 0£ Congress." Those commit-teee are, 
of course, the subject 11atter and appropriations canmittees or each House. 
Between the top career bureauerats and the eomm.tttee chairmen t.here is 
of ten years ot cloee association and understanding ot 1lhat can am \lhat 
cannot be done. Presidmta 4md p0llti.oal. executives oome and go• but the 
chairmen aJ¥i the chiefs are around a long time. they have a common trait 
1n the ab11 t7 to remember favors am fouls. The last thing a bureaucrat, 
either politioal 01' c81'8C", wants is to have Congress conduct a 
1.nV9atigation into hie conduct of public matters. Such invest:LgaticrlS an 
not now coonon. '!'hie does not mean that they are not import.ant. It could 
mean that the mere thought Ol" mention of one is suttic1ent to produce th• 
desired reault.a. 
The Courts 
While the President and Congress exercise control owr the agencies 
almost daily, the courts cannot act until a case comes bef'ore them as an 
appeal from agency actions or sanct.ione. The greatest power the courts 
have is the power to invalidate bureaucratic actiona if they *2Ceeed the 
reasonable limits of delegated powers or if th'Jir adjudications lack 
due process in either procedure or substance. While the Supreme Court 
has not so far invalidated a delegation of power to a regular agency 
6 See Jonph P. Harris, C�essional Control of A&lainistration 
(Wash., D.C . 1  The Brookinp Iiia-tUtion, i?Gi), rn:i.pt. 15. 
created by Congress, it has invalidated delegations of power to the President 
in two cases. H8'fttrthaless. cases involving rul.a-mald.ng and adjudicatJ.on 
tom a considerable part of the total cases col'ldng batore the Circuit courts 
of appeals and the Supreme Court. Roughly tvent;r percent of the Supreme 
Celll'ts• written opin:tone concem administrat:l:99 decisiona. 7 As a 
eoneequence1 a bureaucrat giving an adVieor:r op1n1.on or issuing a 
declaratory order on which people may act v1th SOft8 assurance has lllOl'e than 
just his CMl opinion upon 'Which to rely. He bas a eonnderable bod7 ot case 
law oonceming haw the courts might vlw his actions. Of course it is :ln hie 
best interests to be with the courts prev.1.ous holdings on all matters which 
might just possibly end up in court. The coma are always a good check 
on any temency toward arbitrary use of power. The fact that courts fawr 
settJ.-.ent o! differences in pre-hearing conferences between p31't1.es, bo·th 
in court and administrative procedures, helps to keep bureaucrats reasonable 
am resourceful in .fiD:ling so1ut.ions without re&Gt't to the courts. 
Bureaucrats do not like to lose court battlaa C'lf more than they like to 
be investigat«l by Congress. The Administ:rati ve Procedlll"es Act of 1�1 wi t.h 
minOr amendments. has proven to be a very uHtul. guide, both as to matters 
of procedure am the protection of the rights of all parties concemed. It 
streases the use of infOl"mal means to arrive at the resolutJ.on 0£ differences 
encountered at all stages in the use of the admin1strati� process. 
Section 5 (b) in particular stresses set1'1.ement by consent.8 
7 For an e:xeellent account ot court-agency relationship see Martin 
Shapiro, The S{!l'eme Court md Administrative Asencies (Mew York: The 
Free Presa, 19 ) • Ch.apt. i:-
8Ad:ad.n1.strati ve Proced� �' Statutes !!! Large, !..X• Sec. 5 (b) 
(19L.6) .  
other Restraining Innuence• 
In ecldition to the institutional checks and balances, there are 
other :tnportant considerations which cauae bureaucrats to act responsibly. 
One of the moat 1.mportan't factors is the 1.na.reasing profeaaionalization 
ot the carea aenice and th• increaaing nu11ber of proteaaionala 1111e>ng the 
political appointees as well. The ethics ot prote881.on&l organizaticma 
demand a rather high standard ot oompetenoe and behavior as well as due 
reepect for ln and cuatoa. The intl.uence o£ one' s peers in a profaSSion 
tends t-o stabilise his actions toward rational.iv. To be •90un:i" 1n the 
view ot one•e peers is • value to be t.ake:i seri�. A. pro.teas:ional 
reputation for responsible action 1• al.waya an asset. In public 
adnd.n.18t.ration1 prote•ional.11111 connotes predictability, and predictable 
actions are the vuy toundationa ot bureauoratic organizations a!¥! 
operatiOllS.9 
Outside critics of bureaucratic operationa serve a I110st useful 
10 purpose also. They not onl.Y alert the bureaucrats and the people to 
the possible consequences o! certain courses, but they also often have 
helpful suggestions to ofter. Persons in some f'1elda have made a career 
out or tolloving govennent operations and offering leamed Cld const.ructive 
c.rit.icisms, as well as alternate courses and ditterent objectJ..ves. The 
universities seem to have contributed the m•jority of such persons, but 
the professiorus are not far behind. Some of these critics have served 
9See Victor Thompson, Bureaucracz and Innovation (Tuscaloosa, Ala.1 
Uni verai ty o! .Alabama Press, !§� J 1 PP• �5. 
lOsee W1l ter Oellho-rn, When Americana £o!!l!1-!l ( Cambridge a Harvard 
Un1versitq Prff•• J.966), PP• � 
in go"l9l'IU'Oellt and have considerable kno'W.1.edge of tho practical side of 
things. Others are often g1 ven a chance to serve by being appointed as 
specialists,. advisers or political exacu1;1vea. 
The media and especially television does a reasonably good job of 
keeping the people informed on what the bmoeaucrata are doing or not doing 
by either reporting on their actions or intervisw:i.ng them for � broadcasts. 
Panel discussions or presentattons featuring bu.-reaucrats in the news are 
particularl,y useful both to the media and to the bureaucrat. They provide 
the opportunity for leading newsmen to ask leading questions and the 
opportunity for the bureaucrat to explain what he is doing or what needs 
to be da'le. It eives him the chance to win the support of the people, or 
at least to avoid losing same of the support he already had. It seems 
that the ?li.xon administration is making special efforts to make government 
"visible.,. 
Appraisal. 
Despite all the oritieian of bureaucracy in goverrnent there have 
been no workable solutions offered to avoid ol11" deptrldence upon it. The 
principal suggestions o!f'ered to avoid such heavy dependence upon bureaucracy 
appear to be three in number. First, there is the obvious one ot abolishing 
big government and thereby abolishing the need tor a big bureaucracy along 
w.tth it.11 This is an old bureaucratic trick used by one bureaucrat to 
get rid o� another that he does not like. Few people would bell.eve that 
we can turn the clock back to 1800. 
�r an adverse criticism of positive go�rnment see Friedrich A. 
Hayek, � � � Serfdom (Chicagos University of Chicago Press, 1944). 
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A second suggestion is to a�ain try to separate po1itics and 
administration, as U that might somehow be possible and practicable 
in dealing with values. This suggestion vould require Congress to enact 
statutes in such detail that any discretion on the part of the administrator 
would be unnecessary. Just how Coneress might find the time, the 
infornation, the experience and tho profoss1onalisn to do so is not clear. 
11alph K. lluitt, who has studied Congress for years and is now, himself, 
a bureaucrat in HElt/ has sa;;;ely obsel"V'OO. that "1 t is not easy for a feudal 
system to Make national policy. tt12 If it cannot ·i 1ake broad policy easily 1 
it might have considerable trouble with policy in detail. Further, there 
has been no real evidence offered that Congress is the least bit interested 
in legislating in detail other than in a few particular areas. Closely 
allied to the original suggestion is the one to have Congress supervise the 
work of administrative agencies more closely'.lJ However, it suffers f?"Om 
t..he same f aulta as the one to legialate in detail, but to a lesser degree. 
: rost �cholars;hstudents and all the committees and commissions which 
have oxmained the executive branch favor giv.1.ng more power to the ?resident 
to reorganize tho bureauorac;r and to make it more effective and efficiant. 
However, thorc are dangers to giving the President too much control over 
the burellucracy, both on constitutional and practical groums. The 
constitution lists the powers of Congress 1n considerable detail. To put 
the bureaucracy under the "comand" of the President might well deny the 
12Ra4>h K. Huitt, �o�ress1 � Decades £!_ Analysis (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1969), P• 2 • 
13see Charles E. Hyneman, air�.aU()racz !,!! ! Del!>Ocracz (New Yorkt 
Harper and Row, 1950). 
lbsee especially James M. Landis, The Administrative Process { New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938 );-
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Congrees the infomation and help it needs to legislate intelligently and 
thus interfere with its proper functioning. On practical gronnds, whoever 
contro1s the bureaucracy really controls the government. This was tt'ue of 
our government during World Har II, when for �11 practical purposes the 
President, to whom Congress had given "war powers, tt 1''11 the government 
through the bureaucraey.15 That the President. shou1d have the general 
authority to coordinate the activities of the bureaucracy toward the 
achievement of goal-oriented policies approved by Congrens, few woul.d deny. 
Change when it comes will probably favor mo1."e control arrl coordination of 
the bureaucracy by the President in prflct..iee l"Sther than 1.n theol'IJ and more 
or a sense of responsibility on the part of Congress to help shape some 
national policy as Vi'ell as piecomeal and parocM.a1 pol:teies. Interest 
group policies are not enough. We need more national policy. Perhaps 
Congress is changing as Stephen K. Bailey believes and we may yet see 
Concress reassert i tsel! in the nat1.ona1 polic-.1 malcing field in wh.'lch 
16 tho Pres:!.aent and the bureaucracy are now dominant. 
The control of the bureaucrac-.1 is not one 0£ America '  e ma,ior problems. 
The :;)ajor problem is the p:rcrluction of some goal-oriented national policy 
by the utilizatio!l. of the skills, expertise and in.formation now present 
in the bureaucracies to propose such pol.icy for the c0nsideration of Congress 
and the President. The political control of our armed forces is taken 
for granted in Alnerioa, yet milita�; p�l:lcy is proposed by military leaders 
lS-sae Peter Woll, American Bureaueracz (New Yorks w.w. Norton Co., 
Inc •• 1963). PP• 145-49. 
16see Stephen Ke Bailey, The New Co�ress (New Yorks St. Martina 
Prass, 1966) for his estimate ofSignirical< changes �..n Congress during 
the 196o•s. 
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and either accepted or rejected by the President and Congress. Why this 
could not be true also for the bureaucracy in the executive branch is 
difficult to understand. Both the armed forces and the executive branch 
bureaucracies are good rep:resentat.tve cross sections of American oociety. 
T.f' this fact contributes to our value of civilian control over the military, 
it wonld seem also that it s'1ould contribute to our value of constitutional.ism 
in regard to bureaucracy. 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This stuc\y has traced a chain of historic events over the past 
100 y-ears1 which have transformed our society b-orn a simple agrarian one 
requiring onl.v a limited amount of government to an industrialized­
urbanized one requiring a strong central government with powers to deal 
with the maey political, economic and social problems produced by those 
changes. The oost dramatic need for big government cane during the Great 
Depression (1929•1939) and the need has remained through World War II and 
the Cold War. n1e time when most men were small farmers, business 
proprietors ar lone prof'essionals seans to be gone f'orover in America. 
The interdependence of peopl.e upon each other has increased and the 
depandence or a11 the people upon the government is still increasing. 
Govermient has become the champion of most of the freedoms we enjoy as 
imividuals and of the opportunities for the development or our capabilities 
in our modern mass-cultural society. 
As our nation has developed, government was first drawn into the 
economic field to regulate business and lat.er into the social field to 
alleviate some of tho disJ..oeation problems caused by the industrial 
l'evolution in .America. To fill this need for governnent to act in a 
positive, informed and rational manner, the administrative process was 
used to fit broad policy to particular needs as they were disclosed in an 
on-going process. The administrative process has been subjected to 
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considerable criticism, but no acceptable alternative baa been propoaed 
to replace it. It does allow mmd.mum partieipaUon by the people Who are 
affected in •rriTing et acceptable eolutiona to problems and for the 
aettl.oment of difterenc• by consent rather than court aet1.ol'l8. It 1e 
well accepted by thoae 1lho have had sane experience vi.th its operation, and 
that is a � gnw1ng number of our cit.isens. Its use has g:iTen 
go"f&l'mmt a good insight into the needs tor change as veil as a :measure 
of the requirements to effect that change. 
The need f� the �t to deal with m--.v and varied problana 
has also increased its needs for the eenices of inereasing numbers ot 
men am women of all ekills to man the bureau.cracS.es of the numerous 
agenciee of goverment. Wherever the government haa an interest 1n our 
80Ciety, it baa uaual.JJr created an agency to deal 111.th that interesbJ am 
t.he number ot interest. tend ti<> incre••• Agenc1ea bring together enough 
ot the separated and shared powers, as delegat.1..cma b'm Congrese, to all.aw 
than to deal e.ffecti'9'9ly with the implementati.on of both policy an4 
statute law. The outpits ot goTernnent, with few except.iona, are handled 
through agencies. The agencies are manned With t1IO types ot bureaucrata­
the appointed political executives and the top grade career men. The 
politic.i exee\ltd.Tea concentrate on major policy objectives mxl polltical 
con3ider.-t.tona. The top career men provide the experience, ex;pertise and 
knoVledge to devise workable solutions, to avoid political pitfalls and 
to achieve desired results. Bureaucratic operations are especially beneticial 
for the cont1.nuit;y they provide, the intormat.ion they generate aid the 
legitimacy they help to create and to r.laintain for the goftmnent. 
So 
'lhe bureaucracies in the administrative agencies of our governnent 
make val.uable co�butions to our nonnative concepts of constitutional. 
democracy. The bureaucracies are representative, ra,sponsi ve and highly 
responsibJ.e. They are accountab1e to the people through their alected 
representatives. 'Jith narrower interests and greater depths of under­
standing and abilities, the bureaucracies tend to be more representative 
and reeponaive than individual elective of'fieel's1 or the Congress as • 
whole, in their given areas of responsibility. Checks and balances are 
apparent in the cases ot bur�uerats an:i bureaucracies. Their multiple 
responsibilities to the President, Congres•, the cOUl"ts, groups and the 
pllblic interest operate to keep them in touch with polltieal realities. 
The bureaucrat• a  own a.enee of �hared values with the people and the desire 
for the approval ot hia prof'essional azxl occupational peers are st..rong 
factors tor responsible conduct and competent performance. The real 
problem is not controlling the bureaucracies but giVing them some national 
goal-oriented policies ancl sufficient coordination of effort to allow 
th• to £unction to a higher degree of their real capacities. 
l7ret'!J the results or this study it appears that four concl.usions may­
be indioated1 
(a) That politieally appointed 0£.ticial.s and the top grade career 
men do actually run the machinery o£ �overnment. However, they run it only 
in the direction am at the speed directed by elect.ed oi'f'icials and the 
federal courts. 
(b) Bureaucracies a1¥1 bureaucrats do not pose any great threats to 
our political system. On the contrary they f'ulfill the vital need to 
bring the powers o! government to bear directly on the problems eenerated in 
our present-day society, which only government has any chance to solve. 
While no provisions erlst in our constitution for bureaucracies, 
nevertheless, they have become a part of our constitutional democracy 
through precedent, usage �nd custom. 
(c) A more coordinated effort frcm the bureaucracies of aJJ. the 
agencies eoeae to be desirable. The President seems to be the obvious 
person to coord.'lnate the efforts ot the bureaucracies to acc<:nplil!b policy 
goa:Ls agreed upon by both himself' and tho Congress. The necessary coordination 
can be ach1fff9d onl;r in part through reorganization of the executive brmv;h. 
A ueti.ng ot the minds between the President and Congress to give the 
agencies COfl!mOn objectives will do much more to produce coordinated action. 
(d) If there is an equally reliable representative, responsive and 
effective eubeti tute for the bureauc:raciee or the executi ... ,e branch, it 
has escaped the nrl.Jxis of some of the worlds best scholars, statesnen, 
politicians and soldiers. Modern government can no more operate effectively 
without bureaucratic sJcil1s than modern corporations or modern armies. 
What management is to business,, public administration is to government and 
more. Not only must the affairs of government be roanaged, t...hey must also 
be managed within a politica1 environment, when both political responsibility 
and political accountability are operative factors. 
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